DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod-4) “Carrier Killer” hyper-sonic anti-ship ballistic missile
China has reportedly developed and tested its first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) called DF-21D, with a maximum range exceeding 1,450 kilometres (900 mi), according to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The Intelligence Center did not believe it was deployed in 2009.[9] The guidance system is thought to be still in an evolutionary process as more UAV and satellites are added.[11]
The US Department of Defense stated in 2010 that China has developed and reached initial operating capability (IOC)[12] of a conventionally armed[13] high hypersonic[14] land-based anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21. This would be its first ASBM and weapon system capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers.[15][16] [17] These would combine maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with some kind of terminal guidance system. Such a missile may have been tested in 2005-6, and the launch of the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1 and Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 satellites would give the Chinese targeting information from SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) and visual imaging respectively. The upgrades would greatly enhance China’s ability to conduct sea-denial operations to prevent US carriers from intervening in the Taiwan Strait.[18]
United States Naval Institute in 2009 stated that such a warhead would be large enough to destroy an aircraft carrier in one hit and that there was “currently … no defense against it” if it worked as theorized.[19]
The United States Navy has responded by switching its focus from a close blockade force of shallow water vessels to return to building deep water ballistic defense destroyers.[19] The United States has also assigned most of its ballistic missile defense capable ships to the Pacific, extended the BMD program to all Aegis destroyers and increased procurement of SM-3 BMD missiles.[20] The United States also has a large network optimized for tracking ballistic missile launches which may give carrier groups sufficient warning in order to move away from the target area while the missile is in flight.[21]
Use of such missile has been said by some experts to potentially lead to nuclear exchange, regional arms races with India and Japan, and the end of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, to which the People’s Republic of China is not a party.[22][23]
Some have also suggested China could develop a “MIRVd” DF-21D with multiple independent missiles.[24]
China has recently launched a series of satellites to support its ASBM efforts:
Yaogan-VII electro-optical satellite – 9 December 2009
Yaogan-VIII synthetic aperture radar satellite – 14 December 2009
Yaogan-IX Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation (3 satellites in formation) – 5 March 2010.[25]
Yaogan-XVI Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation – 25 November 2012
China is reported to be working on an Over-the-horizon radar to locate the targets for the ASBM.[26]
An apparent test of the missile was made against a target in the Gobi desert in January 2013.[27]
A Russian Military Analysis report of the DF-21D has concluded that the only way to successfully counter it would be through electronic countermeasures. Conventional interceptions of high-speed objectives have worked in the past, with the Russian report citing the 2008 interception of a malfunctioning satellite by a U.S. cruiser, but in that situation the warship had extensive knowledge of its location and trajectory. Against an attack from the Mach 10 DF-21D without knowing the missile’s launch point, the U.S. Navy’s only way to evade it would be through electronic countermeasures.[28]
The emergence of the DF-21D has some analysts[who?] claiming that the “carrier killer” missiles have rendered the American use of aircraft carriers obsolete, as they are too vulnerable in the face of the new weapon and not worth the expense. Military leaders in the U.S. Navy and Air Force, however, do not see it as a “game changer” to completely count carriers out. Firstly, there are questions on whether it has even entered operational service. Chinese publications said it was deployed in 2010 and U.S. officials reported it reached IOC that same year. Even so, being deployed does not mean it is combat-ready, and the Xinhua News Agency reported that the DF-21D was “still in the research stage” and not yet operational as of July 2011. Secondly, the missile may not be able to single-handedly destroy its target. The warhead is believed to be enough to inflict a “mission kill” to make a carrier unable to conduct flight operations, while other missiles would follow to actually destroy the ship. Thirdly, there is the problem of finding its target. The DF-21D has a range estimated between 1,035 to 1,726 mi (1,666 to 2,778 km), so a carrier battle group would need to be located through other means before launching. Over-the-horizon radars could detect ships, but their exact locations could be off by miles. Chinese recon satellites would be able to look for and locate a battle group. Recon aircraft and submarines could also look for them, but they are vulnerable to the carrier’s defenses. Finally, the missile may have a hard time hitting its target. To hit ships moving at 55 km/h (30 kn; 34 mph), the DF-21D has radar and optical sensors for tracking. These are supposed to make it accurate, but the missile has not yet been tested against a moving target, let alone ones at sea against clutter and countermeasures. The “kill chain” of the missile requires processing and constantly updating data of a carrier’s location, preparing the launch, programming information, and then firing it. How often this is trained is not known, and the U.S. military’s AirSea Battle concept involves disrupting an enemy’s kill chain.[29] Some U.S. analysts believe that the DF-21D doesn’t fly any faster than Mach 5.[30]
The DF-21D reentry vehicle appears to bear similarities to the American Pershing II missile’s RV, deployed in 1983 and withdrawn in 1988 as part of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The Pershing II’s RV weighed 1,400 lb (640 kg) and traveled at Mach 8. It was fitted with four control fins to perform a 25-G pull-up after reentering the atmosphere, then glided 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) to the target and pitched into a terminal dive. Army training manuals about the missile are available on the internet and public open-source literature extensively describes it. The DF-21 has a comparable range and payload. Though much is made of the DF-21D’s damage infliction ability based solely on velocity and kinetic energy, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has calculated that the energy of an inert 500 kg (1,100 lb) RV impacting at Mach 6 had similar energy to the combined kinetic and explosive power of the American subsonic Harpoon anti-ship missile, which is one-quarter the energy of the Russian supersonic 12,800 lb (5,800 kg) Kh-22 missile traveling at Mach 4 with a 2,200 lb (1,000 kg) warhead. Studies conducted by McDonnell Douglas in the 1980s found that small warheads would at least cause enough damage to warships to put them out of commission for repairs.[31]
Should America Fear China’s “Carrier-Killer” Missile?
Nevertheless, some have suggested that the DF-21D has rendered the supercarrier obsolete. While it depends on how we use the term “obsolete,” it’s probably too early to make that claim. China has expended vast time and resources determining how to kill US carriers, which suggests that the Chinese military takes carrier capabilities seriously. Moreover, the number of countries with both the interest and technical capability to develop the system of systems necessary to operate an ASBM is probably limited to two for the foreseeable future, with only Russia joining China.
Still, efforts to diversify US capabilities surely make some sense. SSGNs, equipped with land attack cruise missiles, can pick up a great deal of the slack while remaining relatively safe from attack. Amphibious assault ships, the term the USN uses for its light carrier fleet, can ably carry out much of the “strategic influence” mission that the supercarriers currently provide.
Strategic Relevance
Just because China has ASBMs doesn’t mean that it will use them, even in a shooting war. The point of the “system of systems” is not to use it, but instead to deter the US from going to war. Failing that, it is to deter the USN from aggressively using its carrier groups in combat. Sinking a carrier could kill 6000 Americans in a few minutes, the prospect of which could make the US President reconsider intervention in any dispute with China. Moreover, ASBMs and the other assorted systems would make USN admirals very leery about sailing its primary assets into danger. Aircraft carriers don’t just symbolically represent national power, they ARE national power, and the loss of two or three would dramatically cut US capability to intervene anywhere in the world.
However, The DF-21D will suffer from the same problem as the variety of global strike weapons that the United States and others have considered over the years. A credible threat to kill a US carrier at range is great, but no one has any idea what will happen when the Second Artillery first lets loose with a salvo of ASBMs. Any medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) launched could carry a nuclear warhead, targeted either at a carrier or some other target. Chinese leadership will have to count on very cool heads in Washington for the fifteen minutes between launch and impact. Much will depend on the extent of contact between Beijing and Washington during the process of escalation; if this process has involved multiple misunderstandings, then launching a missile could lead to a degree of escalation that China has not prepared for.
At the extreme, launching at a US carrier represents an enormous risk, because it could start a decision-process that would bring full nuclear retaliation from the United States. That China still lacks a secure second strike capability against the US (and would struggle, in context of a conflict, to safely deploy its ballistic missile submarines) makes the situation even less stable, because the Americans might suspect the PLA of engaging in “use it or lose it” thinking. Even if the US correctly assesses the nature and purpose of the attack, the destruction of a carrier could serve to commit the United States, rather than scare it off.
The United States also faces escalatory problems. Air-Sea Battle, the emerging “operational toolkit” that has dominated much discussion of US Pacific strategy, apparently envisions pre-emptive strikes against Chinese land-based missile installations. Such strikes, which make a great deal of sense from an operational perspective, represent a grave danger of strategic escalation. Again, China must recognize the intent behind US attacks, and refrain from reacting inappropriately, a problem exacerbated by China’s nuclear deficit.
Conclusion
The ASBM is essentially a sea denial/anti-access weapon, not a sea-control weapon. It cannot prevent the USN from killing Chinese ships, only change the method by which the Americans do so. The use of such a weapon in anger would carry the potential for grave escalatory consequences on both sides. It’s difficult to imagine what, besides Taiwan, China and the United States might be willing to tolerate such risk for.
As such, it’s not entirely clear how transformative the weapon really is. It certainly marks an important contribution to China’s arsenal, and a harbinger of China’s growing power. It’s impact, however, is more incremental than revolutionary, especially in context of the steady growth of China’s other anti-access options.
One implication of the development of this system is the need for establishing a reliable crisis hotline between the US and Chinese governments, along with norms about how leadership will handle such communication in a crisis setting. This may prove a tall order for a pair of governments that remain committed to the public position that war is extremely unlikely.
Editor’s Note: This article expands on the thoughts and ideas the author has published previously here.
Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter: @drfarls.
Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Navy/CC by 2.0