STRATFOR Sep. 9, 2015
Military watchers around the world eagerly anticipated China’s Sept. 3 military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the surrender of Japan and the end of World War II. It was the largest since at least 2009, when the Chinese Communist Party celebrated 60 years in power.
The most notable weapons on display were the cruise and ballistic missiles. Tanks, self-propelled artillery and other armored vehicles also rolled by while large numbers of fighter aircraft (including the J-15 carrier-based fighter) and helicopters flew overhead. Missiles that were previously closely guarded were also shown, such as the DF-16 short-range ballistic missile, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-10A land-attack cruise missile and the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile.
Ballistic and cruise missiles, especially those in the very long-range categories, are a crucial part of Beijing’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. For instance, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles form the primary leg of the Chinese nuclear triad. Shorter-range Chinese ballistic missiles (up to intermediate range) as well as cruise missiles also play a key role in China’s conventional deterrence strategy.
Armed with non-nuclear warheads, ballistic and cruise missiles give the Chinese the ability to strike at a heavily defended enemy from a considerable distance, degrading the enemy’s fighting ability before an invasion, neutralizing enemy airpower by knocking out airfields and even striking at naval vessels at sea. When used as part of a layered strategy in conjunction with other weapons and forces, ballistic and cruise missiles can be highly effective.
The Chinese have been steadily amassing short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles — nearly 1,500 are in stock now — within range of Taiwan. In the event of a potential Chinese conflict with the island, China’s DF-16 short-range ballistic missiles and DF-10 land-attack cruise missiles can now strike Taiwanese air defenses, ports, vessels, airfields, command and control centers and infrastructure in a first salvo.
Given the rapid speed at which these missiles travel, the Chinese would benefit from a slower Taiwanese reaction time (especially in a surprise attack) as well as greater survivability against Taiwanese defenses. The Chinese can then, at least theoretically, mount an air and naval campaign against a Taiwan with weaker defenses.
China also can use these missiles as part of a layered strategy in hopes of deterring, delaying or degrading an external response, particularly one from the United States. China could try to deter or degrade any U.S. intervention by aiming an array of missiles, such as the DF-21C and DF-26, at U.S. airbases in the region (especially Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa and Andersen Air Force Base in Guam), as well as by aiming YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles and DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles at U.S. carrier battle groups.
China’s nuclear deterrent could be neutralized by US missile defences.
Currently the PLA has only 20 nm that can on paper reach the US.Assuming US defences can destroy all othem,not an impossible task,China will be naked and assuredly disarmed and destroyed.
However rest assured,the Chinese aint that naïve. They will surely need to increase their nw to at least a few hundred if not a thousand.If the PLA can send guy to space,what’s there to stop them increasing the speed of the nm to mach 10 or even 20.
Imho,even if 90 % of PLA nm are destroyed by US defences in a war ,the US having destroyed China,will have to ponder the destruction and damage done by the balance of PLA nm.
If this doesn’t inhibit the wh from launching a nw,nothing will.Btw,even a cold war warrior ,Dulles,felt uneasy about letting the genie out of the nuclear bottle.He reckoned the nh northern hemisphere could be uninhabited for thousands of years.